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MEDIA MATTERS: REFLECTIONS OF A FORMER WAR CRIMES
PROSECUTOR COVERING THE IRAQI TRIBUNAL
Simone Monasebian*
Publicity is the very soul ofjustice. It is the keenest spur to exertion, and
the surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the judge himself, while
trying, under trial.
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)
The Revolution Will Not Be Televised.
Gil Scott Heron, Flying Dutchmen Records (1974)
I. THE ROAD TO SADDAM
After some four years prosecuting genocidaires in East Africa, and
almost a year of working on fair trial rights for those accused of war crimes
in West Africa, I was getting homesick. Longing for New York, but not yet
over my love jones with the world of international criminal courts and tri-
bunals, I drafted a reality television series proposal on the life and work of
war crimes prosecutors and defence attorneys. I called it "The Real World
Meets Nuremberg,"' and from my prefabricated container office at the Spe-
* The author, formerly a prosecutor at the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda and Principal Defender of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, teaches International
Criminal Law at Seton Hall Law School and has served as Court TV's on-air legal analyst
for the Saddam Hussein and Zacarias Moussaoui trials, as well as a frequent commentator on
international criminal law for other print and broadcast media including CNN, ABC News,
and CBC. The views of the author are her own and do not necessarily represent the organiza-
tion with which she is currently affiliated. The author wishes to thank Harold Burson, Justice
Richard Goldstone, Raymond Brown, Charity Kagwi-Ndungu, and the anchors and produc-
ers of Court TV (Tim Sullivan, Marlene Dann, Emily Barsh, Michelle Richmond, Anne
Hartmayer, Lenore Reigel, Deb Cote, Fred Graham, Jami Floyd, Rikki Kleiman, Lisa Bloom,
Nancy Grace, Catherine Crier, Ashleigh Banfield, Jack Ford, and Vinnie Politan) and CNN
International (particularly Susan Garraty) for sharing their thoughts and considerable experi-
ence. This essay is based on a presentation made by the author at Case Western Reserve
University Law School's Frederick K. Cox International Law Center symposium, "Lessons
From the Saddam Trial", held on October 6, 2006.
1 The Real World, which has been airing on MTV since 1992, was one of the first suc-
cessful reality television series following the personal and professional lives of a group of
diverse individuals forced to live together in a new location for a period of time. See MTV,
The Real World: New York, http://www.mtv.com/ontv/dyn/realworld-seasonl/series.jhtml#/
ontv/dyn/realworld-season l/summary.jhtml (last visited May 21, 2007).
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cial Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), emailed Tim Sullivan, Court TV's 2
senior vice president, for a meeting in New York. How could this topic not
be fascinating to the American public?
A decade earlier, I spent countless hours glued to Court TV's cov-
erage of the Tadic3 trial in The Hague-learning more about the world and
what I wanted to do in it than I had in law school. Until Tadic, I was a
criminal defense lawyer in a New York law firm and never considered be-
coming a prosecutor. It was Court TV's Tadic coverage that set me on a
path to prosecuting genocidiares at the United Nation's International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). I am a firm believer in cameras in the
courtroom and the power of the media to educate.
Tim Sullivan and I shared a preoccupation with the infamous "Cen-
tral Park Jogger" trial. In 1992, Tim, one of Court TV's original anchors,
wrote the authoritative account of that case in Unequal Verdicts: The Cen-
tral Park Jogger Trials. It was the same year I wrote my law school thesis
on the media coverage of the Central Park jogger and Scottsboro cases. In
our writings, we both questioned the coverage of the jogger case and opined
on the impact of that coverage. Ten years later, the widely accepted Central
Park verdicts were overturned after police discovered the actual perpetrator.
While Court TV's producers seemed amused by the reality TV pro-
posal, they had other ideas: "How about covering the Saddam trial, in-
stead?" Three months earlier, in a training arranged by the Regime Crimes
Liaison Office, the Iraqi tribunal judges were advised not to televise the
proceedings.4 Case Western Reserve University Law Professor Michael
Scharf, cautioned the judges about the many risks associated with televising
a major criminal trial, citing the Slobodan Milosevic and O.J. Simpson
cases as examples of reasons for not televising.5 The judges nevertheless
favored televising their proceedings.6 Rule 50 of the tribunal's Revised
Rules of Evidence and Procedure afforded the trial judges discretion to
permit cameras in the courtrooms. Just prior to the opening of the trial, Pro-
fessor Scharf cited the Media Trial7 (for which I had been a prosecutor at
the ICTR) as further reason not to televise, noting: "[i]n the Media Trial
before the Rwanda Tribunal, the presiding judge had to go to extraordinary
2 Launched in 1991, Court TV, is a Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., company, seen in
eighty-six million U.S. homes. Court TV Homepage, www.courttv.com (follow the "about
us" hyperlink).
3 Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-I, Opinion and Judgment, (May 7, 1997).
4 SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL 90 (Mi-
chael P. Scharf& Gregory S. McNeal, Carolina Academic Press) (2006).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze, Case
No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence (Dec. 3, 2003).
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lengths to suppress the dramatic antics of defense counsel who was playing
to the broadcast media.",
8
The Iraqi judges wanted to reach out to the international and na-
tional communities. They understood that television provided such a fo-
rum.9 They apparently believed Lord Hewart's maxim that: "it is not merely
of some importance but is of fundamental importance, that justice should
not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be
done."' Saddam's trials were indeed televised.
But there was merit in Michael Scharf's caution. The media influ-
ences the behavior of any subject in front of its lens. 1 This reality is all the
more amplified in highly-politicized war crimes trials. And while Michael
Scharf's concern may have been defence lawyers and accuseds playing to
the camera, I was more concerned about the media's effect on judges, who
in war crimes tribunals sit as both judge and jury. Tribunal judges were ob-
served to sit up straighter when the international press was under foot. I
recall one war crimes tribunal judge admitting on the trial record to reading
daily media accounts of the case he was judging. One could see indications
of judges influenced by trial media accounts in the way they controlled their
courtroom. Where the coverage was accurate, this sometimes assisted in the
fairness and efficiency of the trials. But where the accounts were distorted,
the judges' responses could reflect the distortion.
Coverage also affected decisions made in war crimes tribunal
prosecution offices. With both the ICTR chief prosecutor and her deputy,
for several years based in the Netherlands and Rwanda, rather than the
court's seat in Arusha, Tanzania, particular attention was paid by them to
media accounts of court happenings in Arusha. One article's passing refer-
ence to my unwieldy hair during the Media Trial, had me running to the
barber, other criticisms led to immediate (albeit, long overdue) changes in
trial team composition, and favorable write-ups afforded me increased lev-
erage to shape prosecution strategy. The media spoke and things happened.
The Media Trial judges held: "the power of the media to create and
destroy fundamental human values comes with great responsibility." 2
Prosecuting media executives for irresponsible and incendiary articles and
broadcasts that decimated Rwanda, I witnessed the power of a salacious
media to misinform, confuse, and incite society. I also found some of the
8 Scharf& McNeal, supra note 4, at 90-91.
9 See id. at 90.
10 Rex v. Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 at 259.
11 See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 549 (1965) ("[W]e cannot ignore the impact of
courtroom television on the defendant. Its presence is a form of mental-if not physical-
harrassment, resembling a police line-up or the third degree.").
12 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, 945 (Dec.
3, 2003).
2006-2007]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
journalists covering the Media Trial unable to get the story right, con-
founded by a blizzard of exhibits in a foreign language, and conflicting
complex testimony. They did not ask the right questions, speak with both
sides of the case, or talk to those involved in the case from the beginning.
The day I gave my closing argument in the Media Trial, I learned a
journalist was writing a book about our case and that a teammate who had
joined the case in the eighth month had been speaking to her about goings
on, in and out of the courtroom, for many months. I felt other members of
the team should have been informed. At the time, I thought the author was
too far along in her writing to consider anything the rest of us might have to
say. After I left the ICTR, the author and I had several discussions about her
first draft. Despite her looming deadline, the conscientious author, made a
number of suggested changes and added other pieces of the story to her
book.13 That experience particularly sensitized me to the importance of
seeking as many perspectives as possible, even from the same side, and the
responsibility one has to both knowing and unknowing subjects.
I wanted to cover Saddam's trial right, and for me that meant being
there. I covered my first, and until Saddam, only courtroom trial as a jour-
nalist twenty-two years earlier-Grandmaster Flash v. Sugar Hill Records,
a federal controversy over whether the artist or the record company owned
the moniker Grandmaster Flash. And while that case involved the livelihood
of one of hip-hop's first recording artists, as opposed to liberty or death of a
twentieth-century tyrant, being there made all the difference. Trial lawyers
and journalists are, after all, storytellers, and nothing beats being on the
ground where the story is unfolding.
When Court TV covered Tadic, the first international war crimes
trial since Nuremberg, they had the exemplary Raymond Brown reporting
from The Hague, in addition to stellar legal journalists such as Fred Graham
and Rikki Kleimann from their New York studio. With Saddam, all cover-
age would emanate from New York, with only a feed from Baghdad. As
Tim Sullivan explained, Court TV was no longer in its infancy when view-
ers might stay tuned to a slow-paced trial for the novelty of it.14 A decade
after Tadic, audiences were accustomed to live televised trial proceedings
and with hundreds of channels from which to choose, became increasingly
fickle about which trials they might sit through. The ratings made clear that
viewers would only tune-in in great numbers to fast-paced, sexy trials.
Court TV learned from the Tadic trial that trials abroad of non-nationals
were not viewer-friendly. Accordingly, less investment in resources and
13 See DINA TEMPLE-RASTON, JUSTICE ON THE GRASS: THREE RWANDAN JOURNALISTS,
THEIR TRIAL FOR WAR CRIMES, AND A NATION'S QUEST FOR REDEMPTION 264, 281 (2005).
14 Author's interview with Tim Sullivan, Senior Vice-President, Court TV News, in N.Y.
(Sept. 15, 2006).
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television hours would go into covering Saddam. I asked Tim, "Why then
cover Saddam's trial at all?" He explained, "We have to cover all historical
trials whether viewers are finding them interesting or not. We knew going
into it that viewers wouldn't be interested, and ratings would be poor, so we
covered it as much as we could, but not all day, everyday-we are not sui-
cidal."
Harold Burson was a young U.S. Army soldier in 1945 when he
was tasked with covering the Nuremberg trials for the U.S. Armed Services
Radio Network. A few days into the trial he snagged the first interview with
Chief U.S. Prosecutor Justice Robert H. Jackson. Burson-who after his
military service would become the founding chairman of Burson-Marsteller,
the world's leading public relations and public affairs firm-covered the
trials from the very first day. He told me that the Palace of Justice was
packed to capacity with hundreds of reporters the first week, and dwindled
down to a fraction of that as the trial progressed until verdict when interest
peaked again.15 While Burson agreed that television audiences are not ordi-
narily interested in viewing long stretches of war crimes trials, he thought
that Saddam Hussein's trial might be more interesting to American viewers
than usual because of the war.
The U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) was deluged with media coverage requests at the onset of the Tadic
trial. Registry staff were overwhelmed with press requests and accommo-
dating seating for the overflow. Within a week, however, the frenzy dwin-
dled. Reporting from The Hague, Raymond Brown described what ensued
next:
During the second week of the trial prosecutors called Muslims and Croats
who had been tortured and who had witnessed rape and murder in northern
Bosnia. In the midst of their dramatic testimony, an American reporter in a
nearby gallery seat, one of the few from a major daily, appeared to stir im-
patiently. Finally he muttered, "My readers don't care about this stuff' and
stalked off into the cloudy Dutch afternoon. 16
Whether from the ground or through the airwaves, covering war
crimes trials poses unique challenges. In Nuremberg, for example, there
were enormous technical problems, and with the exception of CBS News'
Howard K. Smith, a Rhodes Scholar with an unparalleled knowledge of
Germany, most of the journalists suffered from a poor understanding of
German history.' 7 The facilities for journalists were lacking; transportation
IS Author's interview with Harold Burson, Founding Chairman, Burson-Marstellar, in
N.Y. (Sept. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Burson Interview].
16 Raymond Brown, A Fronte Praecipitium A Tergo Lupi: Towards An Assessment Of The
Trial OfDusko Tadic Before The ICTY, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 597, 601 (1996-1997).
17 Burson Interview, supra note 15.
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was problematic; there was no library and no Google, and reporters were
burdened with making an essentially anti-climatic trial, with a certain ver-
dict, interesting. Even more challenging was the tedious pace of the trial,
which often suffered from less than stellar lawyering, a deluge of mind-
numbing documents, and recurring translation problems.
Perhaps Nuremberg Judge, Sir Norman Birkett of the United King-
dom, summed up the problems best in three of his 1946 diary entries, which
have been described as a diatribe against the lawyers, interpreters, and his
more patient colleagues.18
May 23: When I consider the utter uselessness of acres of paper and thou-
sands of words and that life's slipping away, I moan for the shocking
waste of time. I used to protest vigorously and suggest matters to save
time, but I have now got completely dispirited and can only chafe in impo-
tent despair....
June 20: When Flachsner [Defendant Speer's counsel] succeeded
Kubuschok [Defendant Papen's counsel] at the microphone, it became
clear that there were lower depths of advocacy to be reached, unbelievable
as it sounds....
June 21: Oscar Wilde began De Profundis by asserting that "suffering is
one long moment" and the truth of that assertion cannot be better exempli-
fied than in this awful cross-examination, which the Tribunal is compelled
to suffer and endure.'
9
II. AN INCONVENIENT STORY
Consistent and accurate coverage of the Iraqi tribunal presented its
own challenges. Paramount among these challenges were fickle viewers
tuning in for the crazed and raging Saddam acting out in court, while tuning
out for witness testimony. 2° And even a live and raging Saddam cannot
compete with a long-deceased Jon-Benet Ramsey.2 Decimation of thou-
sands as part of crimes against humanity and genocide does not command
the same airtime as the killing of a few. Saddam's trial would have to com-
pete for airtime with other more salacious crimes. CNN's Christiane Aman-
pour was once challenged at a conference by a co-panelist who said, "You
did a great job in Bosnia, why didn't you go to Rwanda where more people
18 TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 418 (1992).
19 Id.
20 Apparently it is also thought to sell books. See, for example, the cover chosen for the
book Saddam on Trial, featuring a photograph of Saddam in a rage during his trial. Scharf &
McNeal, supra note 4.
21 Jon-Benet Ramsey is a child beauty pageant contestant who received extensive cover-
age in the American media after her murder.
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died?, 22 Amanpour replied, "I was in Rwanda. I did cover it. I knew what
was happening but the O.J. Simpson trial was on and I couldn't get on the
air.
' 23
The Iraqi tribunal failed to create an effective office for public out-
reach and media relations, which should have been staffed by an experi-
enced official independent from the prosecutor who could provide reliable
and regular briefings on the tribunal's developments, and post-trial exhibits,
transcripts, budgets, annual reports, and other court documents for world-
wide viewing. The tribunal's website was wholly inadequate. Finding an-
swers from the judges was also difficult because many procedural decisions
were left unaddressed or unexplained. There was a lack of understanding of
civil law proceedings, Iraqi proceedings, and proceedings in international
tribunals. Just before the opening of the Tadic trial, in a Court TV interview,
Chief Prosecutor Justice Richard Goldstone anticipated that this would be a
problem, "[The trial's fairness] is going to be judged by nations and by law-
yers and by commentators from countries who are not used to that form of
proceedings. All the more reason that it's going to be very important to ex-
plain what we're doing and why we are doing it."'24 During a training I con-
ducted with the Iraqi tribunal judges late in the proceedings, they acknowl-
edged their failure to effectively explain what they were doing and why they
were doing it.
Voiceless as a result of translation, faceless and nameless to ensure
anonymity, Iraqi tribunal witnesses were an alphabet soup of pseudonyms,
coming across somehow as less compelling, and more difficult to under-
stand. Anonymous judges and prosecutors exacerbated the problem. There
were technical problems in sound quality, video feed, and translation.25 Un-
certain and erratic court dates made it difficult to schedule coverage and
tough for viewers to coherently follow proceedings. There was little expla-
nation going into and coming out of the sessions from which the public and
press were excluded. In the Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and Sierra Leone tribu-
22 Richard Holbrooke, No Media-No War, 26 PEACE MATrERS: A PEACE PLEDGE UNION
PUBLICATION (1999), http://www.ppu.org.uk/peacematters/1999/pm99sum_media.html,
cited in ELISABETH REHN AND ELLEN JOHNSON SIRLEAF, WOMEN, WAR, PEACE: THE
INDEPENDENT EXPERT'S ASSESSMENT 106 (2002).
23 Saddam's absence-whether due to boycotting, expulsion, or execution-resulted in
less coverage of the trial as public interest waned with Saddam's disappearances. Another
problem in getting the story told was the trial's anti-climatic nature, the verdict being a fore-
gone conclusion.
24 Interview by Court TV anchor, Terry Moran, with Justice Richard Goldstone, prosecu-
tor for the ICTY and the ICTR, on Court TV (1996), available at http://www.courttv.com/
archive/casefiles/warcrimes/reports/interview.html.
25 Since the translation was not meant for those in the courtroom, as in the case of Nurem-
berg, and the Rwandan and Yugoslav tribunals, the quality of the interpretation was not a
priority. Much was lost in translation.
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nals, the judges regularly provided explanations for going into these ses-
sions, generally summarized their results, and permitted the release of re-
dacted session transcripts or permitted court monitors from the public to sit
in on them.26
Reportage through the fog of war also skewed Iraqi tribunal cover-
age. An example was the next-to-last adjournment of the verdict reported as
due to fears of the insurgency, rather than a more likely and mundane ex-
planation. Such adjournments were also routine in war crimes tribunals
where there was no insurgency. Adjournments often occur because judges
feel pressure to set ambitious and sometimes unrealistic deadlines that can-
not be met or intervening circumstances such as changes in judges, counsel,
or the possibility of additional evidence necessitates them.
Despite these difficulties, there was some quality coverage of the
trial, some of which came from "the New Media" and hi-tech means, in-
cluding surfing, blogging, chatting, streaming, "youtubing", and 3G
downloading. A Blackberry could be used to check facts and stories on the
web during Court TV commercial breaks, and on-air anchors had Internet
access via computers beneath their glass-topped desk. The emergence of
blogs, particularly Michael Scharf's Case Western Reserve University's
Grotian Moment Blog,27 which received 127,919 hits, allowed journalists
and the public unprecedented ability to make sense of the trial, access
documents, and obtain thoughtful and diverse perspectives. I witnessed pro-
ducers and anchors checking and even posting questions on the blog. Blog
content seeped its way into coverage.
26 But even at the ICTR, ICTY, and SCSL, closed sessions posed problems. During Tadic,
Raymond Brown wrote:
The greatest fear of journalists covering Tadic's trial is that incredibly important
testimony will be offered in camera. This fear proved to be well founded when,
towards the end of the prosecution case, a redacted transcript of the testimony of
witness L was released. It contained shocking eyewitness descriptions of Tadic's
personal participation in murders, beatings, and rapes [and that he was camp com-
mandant].
Brown, supra note 16, at 610. After particularly controversial usage of anonymous witnesses
in Tadic, war crimes tribunals initially moved towards greater transparency. Tribunals have
recently come under increased criticism by journalists, as the pendulum is seen to be swing-
ing backwards. According to journalist Thierry Cruvellier, "Closed hearings and anonymous
testimonies before the ICTY and the ICTR have gradually not been based on careful exami-
nation of the risks involved, but rather on the institutions' desire to protect themselves. This
is one of the most damaging legacies of the ad hoc tribunals: erosion of public hearings." See
Thierry Cruvellier, An Alarming Decision for Freedom of Press, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
TRIBUNE, March 27, 2006. With regard to secrecy, the Iraqi Tribunal far surpassed the ICTR,
ICTY, and SCSL.
27 Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Grotian Moment: The Saddam Hus-
sein Trial Blog, http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2007).
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Court TV hosted frequent expert webchats, allowing the public to
ask questions and seek clarification about the proceedings, and also put to-
gether an excellent website with the relevant materials. Court TV and CNN
websites' streaming of live and uncut proceedings allowed full, remote ac-
cess to the trial. "Youtubification" also provided unprecedented riveting
footage. Be it the professional "suicide" of Seinfeld's Michael Richards or
the execution of Saddam Hussein, underground citizen journalists equipped
with no more than cell phone cameras and internet access, allowed us to
bear almost immediate witness to what would otherwise be obscured by
"official stories" and disbelief. Soon after Iraqi National Security Adviser
Mowaffak al-Rubaie released official statements describing the execution
and claiming that "Saddam was treated with respect when he was alive and
after his death,, 28 websites' grainy cell phone footage showed otherwise. As
Samuel Johnson once said, "there's nothing like a hanging to concentrate
the mind." While the international press debated how much of this footage
to show on television and on their websites, Iraqis were watching the full
monty on 3G cell phones.
Sixty-one years ago, Justice Robert H. Jackson, in his Nuremberg
opening address, argued, "The record on which we judge these defendants is
the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defen-
dants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our lips as well., 29 There were a
number of excellent journalists and commentators, covering the Iraqi tribu-
nal for television and print media, who recognized the historic importance
of a fair record and asked the right question, "What kind of chalice was be-
ing passed on?"
Court TV, CNN, BBC, and the New York Times produced particu-
larly outstanding coverage. That Court TV's anchors were all experienced
trial lawyers, as were some of the producers working on the coverage, made
a considerable difference. I was impressed with the research and preparation
they devoted to covering this trial. That many of the CNN anchors had cov-
ered genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity-in Bosnia,
Rwanda, and Sierra Leone-and that they had a correspondent in the court-
room, also lent to compelling coverage. John Burns's articles in the Times
were required reading.
Rather than seeking out the usual legal commentators or pundits
who lacked real experience in these types of trials, media outlets sought
analysts with considerable experience advising, establishing, assisting, and
prosecuting at international criminal tribunals. Experts like Mark Ellis, the
28 Christopher Torchia & Quassim Abdul-Zahra, Breaking News: Iraqis Execute Saddam,
E. BAY DAILY NEWS, DEC. 30, 2006, http://www.ebdailynews.com/article/2006-12-30-ap-
saddam.
29 II TRIALS OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
51 (1947-49); Taylor, supra note 18, at 168.
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executive director of the International Bar Association; David Scheffer,
former U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes; and Professor Michael
Scharf's considerable instincts kicked in when the feed or translation was
incomplete or difficult to understand or when bombarded with conflicting
and incomplete information coming through the earpieces or a chyron
crawls during live appearances.
During regular appearances as Court TV's legal analyst and peri-
odic appearances as CNN's guest commentator, I worked closely with the
anchors and producers, on fact-checking, brainstorming, and selecting foot-
age to highlight. Although getting the facts right was my first priority, a
close second was telling a compelling story. As the trial went along, ever
present in my mind was Nuremberg chronicler Rebecca West's commentary
that by the end of that trial, "The courtroom was a citadel of boredom.
Every person within its walk was in the grip of extreme tedium. 30 At Court
TV, where we had longer segments to discuss the trial, we tried to keep the
coverage fresh and compelling by focusing not just on the day-to-day pro-
ceedings, but also on larger issues, such as prevention of genocide; the chal-
lenges and importance of defending clients in a climate of moral outrage;
restorative versus retributive justice; the invisibility of women in the Iraqi
tribunal; why holding perpetrators of mass violations against women ac-
countable for their acts has been a slow and tortuous process; the impor-
tance of an independent judiciary; the inquisitorial versus the adversarial
system; why we allow genocide to occur; attorney ethics; the successes and
failures of the Nuremberg, Rwandan, Yugoslav, and Sierra Leone courts;
the formation of the permanent International Criminal Court; national courts
versus international courts, and the purpose of such courts, as well as alter-
natives such as truth commissions. We also discussed the role of the media
in facilitating and suppressing such crimes and covering the resulting trials,
as well as why viewers should care about the trial. Much of our coverage
mirrored the syllabus of the course on international criminal law I teach
each year. I hope I was a good teacher.
III. THE PUBLICITY BUSINESS
In the Richmond newspaper case, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice
Warren Burger spoke of the importance of justice being "seen to be done"
and the cathartic and prophylactic effect of observing criminal trials. He
wrote:
Civilized societies withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante the en-
forcement of criminal laws, but they cannot erase from people's con-
sciousness the fundamental, natural yearning to see justice done-or even
30 REBECCA WEST, Greenhouse with Cyclamens I, in A TRAIN OF POWDER: SIX REPORTS
ON THE PROBLEM OF GUILT AND PUNISHMENT IN OUR TIME (1955).
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the urge for retribution. The crucial prophylactic aspects of the administra-
tion of justice cannot function in the dark; no community catharsis can oc-
cur if justice is "done in a corner [or] in any covert manner." It is not
enough to say that results alone will satiate the natural community desire
for "satisfaction." A result considered untoward may undermine public
confidence, and where the trial has been concealed from public view an
unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that the system at best has failed
and at worst has been corrupted. To work effectively, it is important that
society's criminal process "satisfy the appearance of justice" . . . and the
appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing people to observe
it.... People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their in-
stitutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited
from observing. When a criminal trial is conducted in the open, there is at
least an opportunity both for understanding the system in general and its
workings in a particular case.
31
In the Nuremberg trials, the United States administration under-
stood the importance of insuring that remote trial could be observed by the
masses, both inside and outside of Germany. Great effort was made to ac-
commodate reporters from more than twenty nations.32 According to Harold
Burson:
the U.S. administration, in the form of President Truman who was follow-
ing Roosevelt policies, wanted the world to know what happened in Ger-
many. The objective was "never again." It was thought that that once peo-
ple found out how debased and degrading to human life it was, that it
would never happen again. You also had General Eisenhower, who was
Supreme Commander of what went on in Germany at that point, and he
wanted the world to know why we went to war and why we were willing
to pay the price-he particularly wanted German people to know .... He
even manned locals to clean up the concentration camps to see for them-
selves what happened there.
33
Ambivalent about cameras in its own courtrooms, the U.S. actively
supported the Iraqi tribunal's decision to televise. Perhaps it was felt that
reminding the public, in detail, how debased and degrading to human life
Saddam's regime was would somehow justify the decision of the U.S. to
invade. With genocides in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Rwanda,
and Darfur occurring in the sixty years after Nuremberg, and in an age of
31 Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571-72 (1980) (citations omitted).
32 "Members of the Fourth Estate who covered the Nuremberg trials were billeted under
the auspices of the United States Army .... [S]everal hundred members of the press were
converging on the old city, and there was no other place large enough to accommodate them.
... In the courtroom 240 seats were reserved for them, and, in a large press room, the trial
proceedings could also be followed from loudspeakers." Taylor, supra note 18, at 219-21.
33 Burson Interview, supra note 15.
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television, shining klieg lights on such events has failed to turn "never
again" into a reality. Some have argued that the more we see genocide tele-
vised, the more we become effectively desensitized, accustomed to it as the
way of the world. Still, 241 days of trying the owners of Radio-Television
Libre Des Milles Collines (RTLM) in the Media Trial, has left a permanent
imprint on my brain as to what the media can accomplish when it puts its
mind to it. Whether or not the Rwandan genocide would have occurred ab-
sent RTLM, undoubtedly it was a powerful accelerant. Genocide is not easy
to perpetrate. It requires a specific intent to accomplish, likewise a specific
intent to prevent or extinguish.
In a September 5, 1988 New York Times Op-Ed piece, William
Safire wrote that "[a] classic example of genocide is under way, and the
world does not give a damn... [Television crews are ignoring Saddam Hus-
sein's] genocidal campaign against a well-defined ethnic group that has
been friendless through modem history and does not yet understand the
publicity business. 34 When it comes to the "publicity business," war crimes
tribunals must strike a delicate balance. Justice Goldstone, when asked just
prior to the Tadic trial whether "one of the aims of the tribunal is to affect
public opinion" answered in the affirmative.35 Asked about the significance
of television cameras in the Tadic courtroom, he responded:
I have no doubt that in any country and... in any international court, the
media is a partner in the whole criminal justice system. If people in the
country are not told what their criminal courts are doing, then... the de-
terrent aspect of criminal justice is going to fail. It is just not going to be
there.
And in earlier days, public trials [and] executions were held in public.
People who were found guilty were flogged in public. And the reasons for
that being done... punishments have to get round by word of mouth.
Today, fortunately in my view for the criminal justice system, we have
television; we have newspapers; we have radio. And people are told ... if
the international community is not told what we are doing here-and par-
ticularly if people in the countries where they are victims do not know
what we are doing-there is no point in doing what we are doing.36
Revisiting these comments a decade after Tadic, he told me, "Deter-
rence is not an easy thing to prove in international or national courts, but I
am confident that even more crimes would have occurred in their ab-
34 William Safire, Op-Ed, Stop the Iraqi Murder of Kurds, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 5, 1988, § 1,
at 21.
35 Goldstone Interview, supra note 24. In response to a question about the aims of the
tribunal, Justice Goldstone answered, "The aim of any criminal justice system ... [is] to
deter people from committing crimes."
36 Id.
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sence." 37 Regardless of its deterrent effect, Goldstone believes media cover-
age advances other important values such as official acknowledgement for
the victims, diminution of denial, and establishment of a written history of
events from which we can learn in the future.
While any deterrent effect resulting from publicizing the existence
and work of war crimes tribunals may be difficult to measure, genocidaires
are now keenly aware of the likelihood of being held accountable. Two
weeks before the RPF liberated Rwanda from one hundred days of geno-
cide, and a year before the ICTR was established, RTLM broadcaster Kan-
tano Habimana, a close observer of international media before and during
the genocide, uttered the following words on his radio program:
If we fight and finally defeat the Inyenzi 38 nobody will try us, because we
will be considered as triumphant warriors. But if we are defeated, it goes
without saying that even if you hide in the bottom of Lake Kivu, they will
do everything possible to fish you out and try you and finally hang you...
. I don't know where they will hang you, but when you're a loser, every-
body will take swipes at you .... as the saying goes, when the cow is
down, every other cow tries out its hom. We have no other way of defeat-
ing these people who want to discourage us by threatening to bring us be-
fore the international tribunal, or wherever ... We have to fight all these
people who are trying to demoralise us ... so as to pursue our set objec-
tive.39
Genocidaires in the making, as well as those in the act, watch and evaluate
us-sadly, closer than we monitor them.
From the beginning of his term as prosecutor of the ICTY and
ICTR, Justice Goldstone considered the impact of tribunal media coverage
locally and globally. He devoted about twenty-five percent of his time to
media background briefings for press from all over the world and asked the
Rwandan government to broadcast filmed proceedings via huge television
screens in national stadiums.4 ° While there were initial efforts by Goldstone
and others to reach out to the public and establish positive relations with the
media, on the whole, war crimes tribunals' efforts in this area were seen to
be insufficient. The ICTY eventually launched a public outreach program in
late 1999, and soon after the ICTR adopted similar efforts-both only after
much criticism that they did not reach out to the populations for whom they
37 Author's interview with Justice Goldstone, Proecutor, International Criminal Tribunal
for Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, (Feb. 5, 2007).
38 Inyenzi was a code word for Tutsi or cockroaches.
39 Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki, & Imanishimwe, Case No. ICT 99-52-T, P. Exhibit
P103/214B (July 1, 2002).
40 Author's interview with Justice Goldstone, supra note 37.
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primarily exist. One senior ICTY court official put it this way to journalist
Samantha Power:
In Western countries, courts automatically have a certain respect. They are
recognized in the community. People understand their role; they are cov-
ered in the press; citizens may serve in juries. They simply don't need to
promote themselves. But if you are doing what we are doing, hundreds of
miles away, in a different language under a different system, you have to
do things that courts don't ordinarily do.... If you just sit here and hear
cases, you simply won't get the job done.4 1
Can war crimes tribunals go too far when they believe they "have to
do things that courts ordinarily don't do"? Is there a danger when their offi-
cials understand the "publicity business" too well? Yes, on both accounts.
As the first war crimes tribunal since Nuremberg to be based in the
country where the atrocities occurred, the SCSL was determined to make
public outreach and publicizing of justice a priority. Particular effort was
paid to conducting press briefings and town hall meetings held by the
prosecutor all over Sierra Leone, at the pre-indictment and pre-trial stages.
The court's first prosecutor, appointed in June 2002, arrived in Freetown in
August. A Special Court Outreach Office was immediately set up and lo-
cated in the Office of the Prosecutor. With no defence counsel yet hired, or
any figure yet appointed as counterbalance to the overwhelming power of
the prosecutor, defence outreach issues were not a court priority. In January
2003, the outreach office was re-located from the Office of the Prosecutor to
the court's registry section, but even this move could not level the playing
field.42 The prosecution already had a huge head start in shaping public
opinion in the media and at the grassroots level. Better resourced and better
staffed, the prosecution could afford to devote more attention to outreach
than could the defence. Although the Court created a principal defender
position in early 2003 to counterbalance the prosecutor and serve as a "fear-
less advocate" for the defence, over a year went by before they appointed
anyone to that position. In the interim, the office was staffed by two or three
extremely devoted Sierra Leoneans and two different, hardworking acting
heads of the defence office.
41 SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 207
(2002).
42 While the efforts of the outreach office were noble and highly valuable, they were not
without problems. For example, they produced and widely disseminated a pamphlet in Eng-
lish and Krio, titled "The Special Court Made Simple" with language suggesting the guilt of
the accused and drawings of the accused in handcuffs standing before the judges. However, it
should be noted that the outreach coordinator, a dynamic and extremely conscientious indi-
vidual, was receptive to concerns expressed by both sides of the court and agreed to revise
the pamphlets when objections were brought to her attention, albeit long after the initial
distribution.
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When I was appointed that court's principal defender in March
2004, over a year and a half after the chief prosecutor's appointment, and
only three months before the first trial began, the staffing and resources for
the defence had already been decided, and it was rather late in the game for
any real counterbalancing. On my last day of the job, the judges passed a
code of conduct for defence and prosecution counsel containing a rule on
"contact with the media" providing, inter alia, that "[c]ounsel shall not
comment on any matter which is sub judice in any case in which he is in-
volved. 'A 3 Other tribunals had no such rule. I argued unsuccessfully that this
would compound the head start the prosecution already had. But the judges
adopted this rule after expressing concerns about the media poisoning the
well. In their view, justice was best served if both sides could no longer
speak on pending matters. But I felt their antidote to be more prejudicial
impact-wise on the defence. To be fair to the judges, a few months earlier,
they took the unprecedented step to rule-over the prosecution's objec-
tion-that any code of conduct for counsel would equally apply to the
prosecution. At the other tribunals, the code of conduct for counsel applied
only to defence counsel. 44
Prosecutors' notions of justice, and its being seen to be done, can be
as different as night and day. In one war crimes tribunal, the accused and
their counsel reported that a chief prosecutor was heard to utter in a public
outreach forum "may [the accused] never see the light of day," among other
such comments. Justice Goldstone consistently spent his time reminding the
public that "whether there are convictions or whether there are acquittals
will not be the yardstick of the ICTY. The measure is going to be the fair-
ness of the proceedings. 45
43 Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel with the right of Audience before the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, Art. 13(b), adopted on May 14, 2005, http://www.sc-sl.org/
Documents/counselcodeofconduct.pdf.
44 The prosecution opposed my proposal to the judges, that they be covered by any code of
conduct, arguing that they did not need one overseen by judges, because they were UN em-
ployees bound by the UN's internal general staff rules (i.e. rules that applied to UN electoral
monitors, drivers, cooks, librarians, and doctors, but did not in any way deal with legal eth-
ics, courts, or trial conduct). The prosecution further argued that if those rules were not
enough, the prosecutor would be responsible for any further disciplining in his office. Once
the judges made it very clear that one would be imposed on them, whether or not they
agreed, they quickly began participating in the process of creating the joint code of conduct.
45 Goldstone put his money where his mouth was-when approached by CEELI soon after
his appointment and asked how they could assist his office, he responded, "the most impor-
tant form of assistance would be to ensure the defendants were adequately represented."
RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY: REFLECTIONS OF A WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATOR 119
(2000). Perhaps his experience in South Africa provided unique sensitization about the im-
portance of the rights of accused persons.
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A few months into Saddam's trial, a highly esteemed journalist
suggested that war crimes courts have an affirmative moral duty to enter the
publicity business even before trials:
I told the ICC Prosecutor that I know he has a enormous vault of photo-
graphic and video images of the atrocities in Darfur and that he really
should release the evidence to the public and the press. If we had those vis-
ual images we would cover Darfur and the ICC more, and this would put
needed pressure on the international community to stop the genocide. I do
not understand why he is not doing this.
I responded to his lament with the possible reasons why the prosecutor
might not do so, such as confidentiality and integrity of evidence or that it
might be frowned upon by the pre-trial chamber. The journalist responded,
"But people are raped and dying as we speak." He was right about the
unique power media images could have on policy-makers. Explaining the
reversal of her opposition to lifting an arms embargo, to allow vulnerable
Muslims some measure of self-defense, California Senator Dianne Feinstein
told the New York Times: "for me the turning point was the attack on Sre-
brenica, that weekend with all the missing people... one image punched
through to me: that young woman hanging from a tree. That to me said it
all.", 6
When I was at the SCSL, the Press and Public Affairs Office regu-
larly produced videos that it publicized on its website, among other outlets.
Some of the videos were quite good, others were problematic-unidentified
footage of the conflict, injured persons, mutilated bodies, and the like, inter-
spersed MTV-style with images of witnesses testifying in the courtroom,
and the accused observing the proceedings. Hi-tech and compelling on one
hand, but prejudicial on the other. Court staff with legal training found the
videos troubling and expressed their concern, but those without legal train-
ing did not always appreciate the concern expressed.
The desire to protect innocent lives, a climate of moral outrage over
heinous acts, and the bright hot lights of fifteen minutes of fame make for
an intoxicating cocktail capable of dulling inhibitions and easily propelling
one to cross the line. Just how far is too far is not always an easy call. What
is "crossing the line" when it comes to media matters? As U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Potter Stewart indicated trying to explain the meaning of "ob-
scenity": "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I
understand to be embraced... [b]ut I know it when I see it."47
46 Elaine Sciolino, Senate Vote to End Embargo May Prove a Pyrrhic Victory, N.Y.
TIMES, July 28, 1995, at Al.
47 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
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IV. INCONVENIENT TRUTHS
In the absence of sufficient traditional media coverage of war
crimes tribunals, another type of reportage has filled the vacuum. Those
seeking news about such courts increasingly rely on daily or periodic re-
ports by human rights groups, rights NGOs, and rights-related university
centers (hereinafter collectively referred to as "rights groups"). They are
humanity's conscience, and the world would be a much more frightening
place without these organizations and their committed staffs. However,
rights groups oftentimes are not disinterested parties. Their perspective,
orientation, and training, is very different. While their reportage may be
more comprehensive, benefiting from access to information outsiders in the
traditional press may not, their reportage can also be plagued by conflicts of
interest and incestuous relationships.
Rights groups may serve as prosecution advisors or expert wit-
nesses; they may vy for contracts from funders inside and outside the court,
to train court staff and officials; and they may engage in other projects that
would require the prosecutor or registrar's blessing. I found it interesting
that one rights group, while reporting on one tribunal, organized a training
session for judges that was to be conducted by judges and prosecutors at
another tribunal. When I asked the organizer why no defence counsel were
included as trainers, the organizer replied that it just never came to mind. To
their credit, they immediately agreed to add two defence lawyers to the
training. But this is just one of many examples of their orientation. Hearts in
the left place and on the side of the angels, rights groups are sometimes in
the business of hunting those they believe to be war criminals, waging vo-
ciferous media and political campaigns aimed at apprehending and indicting
individuals who may be prosecuted by these courts.
Rights group reporters tend to be inexperienced. So many of them
cover these tribunals as a means to attaining their ultimate goal, a post in the
prosecution or registry. Better to say certain things and not say other things,
if your dream is to work at the place you are covering. The advocacy efforts
of some of these groups has led to the creation of the particular court they
cover, and the indictment of the particular accuseds to be tried. Like any
proud parent, they desperately want to see their offspring succeed. While
there is, to a certain extent, a belief that criticism makes these courts
stronger, and they have issued some very strong and useful criticisms of
these courts, there are those who feel uneasy telling the whole truth and
letting the chips fall where they may.
Rights reporters are more likely than traditional journalists to have
personal relationships with the subjects of their reportage.48 Perhaps most
48 When young rights reporters go to far-away places for long periods of time, with little
recreation, and only other tribunal people with whom to socialize, things happen. Of course
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troubling is that they have insufficient or no journalistic training. For exam-
ple, a draft report circulating about one tribunal, contained false and de-
famatory claims made about a former court official. Just before its planned
publication, the former official happened to come across a copy and wrote
to the principal of that group requesting that the material be withdrawn.
Fortunately, the former official had documents proving the false nature of
the claim, and the principal immediately offered a written apology. The
young reporter on the ground never bothered to check the accuracy of the
claims with the former official or consider the reasons why a confidential
source might make such claims. Problematic reports about court proceed-
ings were circulated by that same rights group on an earlier occasion. The
principal of that group confessed to the former official that they would seri-
ously rethink the way their staff was going about these reports.
Although rights organizations have been an enormous asset to the
cause of justice, and the principals of rights groups are persons of immense
integrity and experience, they have, for the most part, utterly failed to ad-
dress these problems or provide adequate supervision of their charges conti-
nents away. Some because they are unaware of the problem, others because
they are not sure what to do about it. While rights reporters serve an impor-
tant purpose filling in for their phlegmatic brethren in the traditional media,
"task-oriented" traditional media serve a unique honest broker objective
function "mission-oriented" activist "rights reporters" too close to their sub-
ject often cannot.
When I approached Radioscope, a nationally-syndicated U.S. radio
program in 1983 with a proposal to cover a relatively new phenomenon
called "hip-hop", it was because I felt the media was neglecting an impor-
tant story. I believed that much could be learned about ourselves and the
way of the world from what hip-hop artists were saying-if we listened. I
felt very much the same about the story of international criminal tribunals
(ICTs) when I approached Court TV in 2005-that the media was not suffi-
ciently covering these new courts, and that much could be learned if we
paid better attention. Before knocking on Radioscope's door, a handful of
other radio programs turned me away. Hip-hop made them nervous; they
relationships between journalists and their subjects can occur in the traditional media, but the
likelihood is less so. Traditional journalists either are open about their relationships in their
articles, or they move onto another story to cover. Their goal is not to work for the tribunal,
but rather to progress in their career as a journalist, and conflicts of interest can destroy any
such career. An ugly war between two divisions of one tribunal almost ensued when official
X in one branch of the tribunal, became incensed about Y's, in another branch, relationship
with a talented, but compromised, author of reports about that court. When Y tried to hire the
reporter, X sent an anonymous email to the reporter threatening to blow the whistle on the
whole matter if the reporter took the job. Y used court resources to trace the emails back to X
and made it very clear to X that there would be consequences if X blew the whistle. Y then
abandoned hiring the reporter, who continued to be involved in covering that court.
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did not understand it or see its value, so encouraging media outlets to cover
it was difficult. ICTs, like hip-hop, are not easy on the ear; they make us
uncomfortable but offer essential, unspeakable, and inconvenient truths.
Reflecting on his experience covering the Tadic trial, Raymond
Brown struggled with the traditional media and the American public's par-
ticular lack of interest in ICTs, despite the value obtained from such cover-
age. He found some insight from one of the Tadic trial judges, Gabrielle
Kirk McDonald, an American:
We ourselves in the United States I think still have a problem dealing with
ethnic differences, and what has happened in the former Yugoslavia, of
course, is nothing that we would ever expect to occur in the U.S. but is an
example of what can happen when you don't resolve your ethnic divisive-
ness. When you cannot come to respect people for their difference and ac-
cept the differences and yet live together and respect each other, that is
what happens. So it seems to me that to the extent that we in America have
not come to grips with our kind of aspirational assertions of equality and
non-discrimination-and with the reality of discrimination-that there are
some parallels, and so perhaps we can learn something.
49
As to the "American disconnect", Justice Goldstone, attributes this in part to
the negative approach of U.S. politicians to international criminal law:
"This does have a very important negative effect on public perceptions and
especially with regard to the ICC," he argues. 50
"The so-called CNN Effect-the way in which CNN's coverage can
define a story-has become so pervasive that former UN Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali called CNN the '16th member of the Security Coun-
cil."' 51 The media is an important partner in serving the cause of interna-
tional justice, and there are a few simple things ICT's can do that may better
engage them. Increasing the efficiency of proceedings increases the ease
and likelihood of its coverage, as does putting further effort into appointing
media savvy heads of ICT press and public affairs offices and resorting to
closed sessions only when truly warranted. Better storytelling by prosecu-
tors would also be helpful, not only to the media, but to the judges and de-
fence counsel who must struggle to coherently follow case-in-chiefs that are
sometimes disorganized, whether the fault of the prosecuting trial attorneys
or the result of the poorly-conducted investigations they inherit. More than
once I have seen judges and defence counsel scratch their heads wondering
49 Brown, supra note 16, at 612 (citing Judge McDonald's May 3, 1996 Court TV inter-
view with Terry Moran).
50 Author's interview with Justice Goldstone, supra note 37.
51 WOMEN, WAR, PEACE, supra note 22, at 106, cited in LARRY MINEAR, COLIN SCOTT, &
THOMAS G. WEISS, THE NEWS MEDIA: CIVIL WAR AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION (1994) at 4
(quoting Boutros-Ghali).
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what the heck is the prosecution's theory today? Prosecution offices would
do well to build the art of storytelling into their training repertoire. Good
storytelling and "playing to the media" are, however, two very different
things and ought not be confused. Of course all of these suggestions should
be taken with serious consideration for the rights of the accused at the out-
set.
In the months leading up to the Rwandan genocide, hate media
journalists sometimes began their heavily-coded broadcasts with the words:
"those for whom this message is intended will understand" or "I speak to
those who listen well." It was a boastful recognition of the power of mes-
saging and their success in communicating their ideas to their intended con-
stituencies. It was also a nuanced warning that if you ignored the message,
you did so at your peril. Although more can be done, ICTs have made vast
improvements in their messaging to those where the conflicts occurred.
However, few strides have been made in messaging to the international
community, international media, and Americans in particular. Few, if any,
stories are as important as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes. Few, if any, venues provide a better opportunity to learn about our-
selves and the state of our planet than ICTs. We ignore their messages at our
own peril, among others.
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